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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH TURKEY GROWERS, INC. , a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Civil No. 15694 
In this action the plaintiff-appellant seeks a money 
12 judgment against the defendant-respondent. Respondent sold turkeys 
and retained the proceeds from the sale of those birds without 
12 
delivering to plaintiff the amount plaintiff claims was due it. 
i2 
Plaintiff claims at all times it had a security interest in the 
turkeys and in the proceeds from their sale. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial judge, The Honorable Don V. Tibbs, district 
Judge in the Sixth Judicial District, sitting without a jury, 
dismissed plaintiff's complaint against the defendant. He also 
dismissed defendant's counterclaim against the plaintiff. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
i 
Appellant seeks to have this Court reverse that portion o'l 
the lower court judgment which dismissed plaintiff-appellant's 
complaint. It seeks to have this Court direct the lower court~ 
enter judgment in favor or the plaintiff. Plaintiff-appellant does 
not seek reversal of that portion of the trial court judgment whic!. 
dismissed the defendant-respondent's counterclaim. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant-respondent (hereafter UTG) is, and at least, 
since 1973, has been an agricultural marketing cooperative which 
processes and sells turkeys raised by its member growers. Duri~ 
the period 1973 through 1976, its largest single member grower we 
partnership comprised of Ivan E. Carlson, Clair R. Carlson and 
Vernon J. Carlson, and generally known as Carlson Brothers. 
Plaintiff-appellant (hereafter Bank) had financed the 
turkey growing operations of Carlson Brothers for some time, a~, 
specifically provided financing for Carlson Brothers' operations 
during the years 1973 through 1976 (Tr. 32-33, 257). The partner· 
ship members of Carlson Brothers signed security agreements in h0 
of the Bank for the years 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976 (Exhibit P-4,' 
Tr. 32, 257-259). The Bank filed financing statements on those 
security agreements with the Secretary of State's office (Exhibit 
P-6, Tr. 33). Certified copies of the financing ~tatements were 
received as evidence at trial (Exhibit P-8, Tr. 34-35). The 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-3-
security agreements signed by Carlson Brothers in favor of the 
1 «
1 
plaintiff-appellant specifically gave the Bank a security interest 
I in Carlson Brothers turkeys and in the proceeds from the sale 








security agreements stated that: 
Debtor [Carlson Brothers] will not sell or 
dispose of any of the collateral covered 
hereby, nor part with possession of any of 
the same or proceeds thereof except to Bank 
or with consent of Bank nor remove or permit 
it to be removed from the county where now 
situate without the prior written consent of 
Bank, except as necessary to feed or other-
wise care for the collateral. (emphasis 
added). 
The security agreements and financing statements were given 
to secure various promissory notes and extensions of notes which 
Carlson Brothers owed the Bank (Exhibit P-1, Tr. 32-33). Business 
records of the Bank reflect that Carlson Brothers outstanding unpaid 
obligation to the plaintiff-appellant Bank is at least $556,342.46 
(Exhibit P-2, Tr. 31-32), which sum the Bank has been unable to 
collect. 
Throughout the 1973 through 1976 period in question, the 
defendant UTG processed and sold the turkeys of its member growers 
to Norbest, Inc. Prior to the 1976 growing year all of UTG's member 
growers, including Carlson Brothers, were under a common pool 
arrangement with the defendant (Tr. 179-180). In this arrangement 
all birds of the member growers were commingled and merged into a 
oornmon flock. After the birds were processed and sold, the 
ili 
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defendant would settle with each grower individually. Each 
grower's settlement distribution was based on that grower's 
percentage of total poundage of the common flock. (Tr. 179). 
defendant would sell the entire flock to Norbest, Inc. Norbest 
would pay defendant for the birds, and defendant, after subtractir::l 
processing costs on a per pound percentage basis (Tr. 176-175), 
would make distributions to its various member growers. 
Although the periodic advancements made by UTG to its I 
growers did not necessarily constitute the exact sum the gro~r~ 
eventually to receive, a yearly final settlement statement and a 
final settlement check (usually prepared into the next growing I 
year) were to reconcile all advances and charges to the grower fori 
the year. Evidence introduced at trial clearly revealed the 
understanding of both U'fG's management, and the individual growerol 
! 
that a final settlement was to conclude and reconcile finally all, 
advances made and charges assessed against the grower for the ~~ 
in question. (Tr. 178, 261, 190-291, 301-302, 311). When the 
I 
final settlement check was issued, it was assumed that all charge;! 
for that growing year had been subtracted. The net amount of tha: 
check was the final reconciliation between the grower and the 
processor (Tr. 178, 261, 301-302, 311). 
Insofar as its present President could recall, the defer:. 
ant, prior to 1976, had never assessed an offset against its 
growers after a final s•. 1.tlement for the prior grm,•ing yevr had 
been finalized. (Tr. 322) (See also Tr. 308). 
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During the period relevant to the lawsuit the Bank was, 
of course, aware that the UTG was processing Carlson Brothers' 
turkeys. It was generally aware that the defendant was selling 
the turkeys of its member growers to Norbest. But the Bank also 
had expected to be paid and, in the usual course of its business, 
was generally paid the net proceeds the defendant received from 
the sale of Carlson Brothers' turkeys. The Bank had financed 
operations of Carlson Brothers for several years, and had never 
been aware that Utah Turkey Growers might attempt to exercise a 
retroactive setoff after it had finally settled with Carlson 
Brothers for any growing year. There was no history of dealings 
by which the Bank was put on notice that UTG might pierce its own 
final settlement and retroactively claim from its growers purpor-
ted overadvances for years earlier than the final settlement. 
Although unaware of any overadvances made to Carlson 
Brothers by UTG, the Bank, in 1976, was concerned about Carlson 
Brothers' ability to pay off its existing loans with the Bank. 
gesl Accordingly, for the 1976 growing year, the Bank urged Carlson 
ha: Brothers to alter in some material respects its arrangement with 
the defendant. Consequently, for the 1976 growing year, Carlson 
Brothers' turkeys (all of which were secured collateral of the 
er Bank) were not placed in the usual common flock with birds of the 
other birds owned by the various member growers of UTG. Rather, 
for 1976, Carlson Brothers' turkey crop was the subject of "live 
flock" or "direct marketing" agreement. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-6-
Under the direct marketing arrangement Carlson Brothers' 
1976 turkeys were not commingled with the birds of defendant's ot 
growers (Tr. 181), but were sold in identifiable lots to the 
defendant. The defendant then sold those birds, again in a separc'' 
lot or lots, to Norbest. The turkeys of Carlson Brothers were 
1 
weighed live and paid for on a live basis (Tr. 180). Both UTG anc I 
I 
Norbest treated the birds on a different basis than they did birds 
which were part of the general common pool of the defendant's 
remaining turkey growers (Tr. 182, 184-185). 
Under the live flock contracts betv1een Carlson Brothers :·1 
UTG and Norbest (Exhibit P-12), there was not only a different 1 
I 
marketing arrangement than had been the case under the common poc~,l 
but also, and more importantly, a substantially altered position c'( 
Carlson Brothers vis-a-vis Utah Turkey Growers (Tr. 
turkeys Carlson Brothers sold UTG in 1976 were on a 
I 
186-190). Th' I 
I 
non-member bas:l 
quite different from the traditional common pool (Tr. 186). Carlsol 
Brothers waived patronage equities under the new arrangement t~t 1 
I 
would not have been waived under the old (Tr. 187). Margins whic'' 
otherwise would have belonged to Carlson Brothers became margins 
belonging to the defendant (Tr. 189-190). The birds sold by Car;;:: 
Brothers to UTG in 1976 were no longer considered membership ton·•:! 
(Tr. 190). In short, the birds sold by Carlson to the ilefenc1ant 
1976 were sold under a materially different arrangement than 1' 01 
existed earlier, and Carlson Brothers found itself in a suhsL': 
ally different economic relationship with UTG. 
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It is noteworthy that at the time the 1976 direct marketing 
agreement between Carlson Brothers and UTG was signed, and the 
altered relationship between those parties was thus created, no 
indication was given by UTG to Carlson Brothers that the defendant 
intended to setoff alleged overadvances on pre-1976 turkeys against 
the new and different 1976 live flock or direct marketing agreement 
(Tr. 262-263). 
Prior to August 1, 1976, the Bank was not aware of any 
overadvancement in favor of or offset to be claimed against Carlson 
:·1 Brothers (Tr. 66). However, during the year 1974, it was apparent 
to Kendrick Harward, UTG's then manager, that defendant's payments 
received for 1974 birds were being used to pay for the 1973 final 
settlement. And in 1975 he felt that monies received for 1975 birds 
hE:
1 
were being used to pay the 1974 final settlements (Tr. 337-338). 
I 
~j Yet, although Mr. Harward was aware that the Bank was financing 
lESI Carlson Brothers' operations (Tr. 333), he didn't inform the Bank of 
t I his concerns that money for current year birds was being used to pay 
c'! on prior year's settlements (Tr. 338) . 
An important fact in this case is a January, 1976, letter 
1'' sent by UTG to the Bank (Exhibit P-9). In late 1975 or early 1976 
r~:l Byron Cheever, Manager of the Spanish Fork branch of the Bank, 
requested that Gaylord Harward, Manager of the defendant, supply the 
I I Bank with a letter regarding the status of Carlson Brothers turkeys 
held by UTG. The Bank requested this information so that the Bank 
might know what monies it could expect to receive to reduce the 1975 
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I 
year Carlson Brothers' loans. The Bank also wanted that informatiq 
to determine whether it would finance the 1976 turkey operations o'l 
i Carlson Brothers (Tr. 50). When the request for information was 
received by Mr. Gaylord Harward he assumed the Bank wanted the 
information because it was interested in the amount Carlson Broth~:~ 
would receive from the 1975 birds (Tr. 154). He knew the plaintifl 
looked to the defendant and to him, as manager, to furnish the Ba~·i 
accurate information as to the status of the Carlson Brothers' 
account (Tr. 154). And, finally, he assumed the Bank wanted the 
requested information because Carlson Brothers had outstanding 
obligations it owed to the Bank (Tr. 155). 
The January 7, 1976, letter was written to the Bank undc 
UTG's letterhead (Exhibit P-9). It was signed by its manager inU 
official capacity as manager of the defendant-respondent (Tr. 150: · 
The information gave Carlson Brothers' total tonnage for the 197! I 
year (Tr. 155). It referred to advances to date made by UTG in 
favor of Carlson Brothers (Tr. 156). And also mentioned anticipa'l 
future sums hoped to be realized if market conditions held 
(Tr. 156-157). Mr. Hanvard knew that by giving the Bank all oft·: 
.,I 
information, he had given the Bank a basis by which it could mu;.·, 
ply tonnage by price to be realized, and, thus an anticipated 
settlement figun' (Tr. 157). InC!eed, Mr. Hanvard anticipated t''1 
Bank would make such multiplications when he provi.deci it with ti., 
information (Tr. 158). By multiplying the tonnage by anticipoi' 
price, the Bank determined that Carlson Brothers wouln receive 
$400,000 from the final settlement (Tr. 51). 
I 
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The letter made no references to any UTG concerns about 
overadvancement made by the defendant in favor of Carlson Brothers. 
The Bank was given no any indication that UTG intended to exercise 
any setoff against any such overadvances (Tr. 158). Mr. Harward 
admitted that during the period between September, 1974, and 
September, 1975, he discussed with his father and predecessor 
manager of defendant, possible shortages which had arisen because 
the defendant was paying for prior years' birds with current year's 
money (Tr. 160). After the settlement of the 1974 year it was 
evident that shortages were present (Tr. 161, 337). 
Absent knowledge or information that sums had been over-
advanced to Carlson Brothers by the defendant, the plaintiff 
advanced Carlson Brothers about $593,000 in 1976 (Tr. 65). The 
·:~ 
1 information contained in the January, 1976, letter (Exhibit P-9) was 
1'1, 
~ I 
~ ; ,I 
"I 
I 
part of the information the Bank used in determining whether to 
finance Carlson Brothers 1976 credit line (Tr. 52). Mr. Roy W. 
Hanson, a senior Vice President of the Southern Division of plain-
tiff, and one of the representatives of plaintiffs who participated 
in its decision to advance 1976 monies to Carlson Brothers, 
testified that the January, 1976, letter "was a very basic factor" 
in the decision to extend credit to Carlsons for its 1976 operations 
(Tr. 101). 
As late as August 21, 1976, the Bank still believed it 
~ould receive from UTG a sum of about $400,000 for the final settle-
ment of Carlson Brothers 1975 turkey crop (Tr. 55). A Bank document 
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(Exhibit P-5) dated in early August, 1976, refers to a telephone 
I 
call made by the Bank to the defendant-respondent, and in which t~\ 
defendant indicated it had mailed a $55,000 check to the Bank on I 
Carlson Brothers' behalf, and that 
• the settlement for the 1975 turkeys in 
the approximate amount of $415,000.00 will 
ber mailed before the end of this week. 
(Exhibit P-5). 
The Bank never received that dollar amount or any part of I 
that amount from Utah Turkey Growers from the 1975 final settle- I 
ment for Carlson Brothers (Tr. 58). By August, 1976, the defend-
ant either had setoff or knew it would setoff against its growers' ,1 
I 
1975 settlement to correct the alleged overadvancements made in [ 
prior years (Tr. 202). 
UTG' s concern about the possible over advancements led it 
to request its accountant, DeLance W. Squires to conduct an inten-~ 
sive examination of its books in May or June of 1976 (Tr. 120). 
Although Mr. Squires had audited the operating portion of the 
defendant in prior years, he had not, prior to 1976, been asked tel 
review the grower settlement accounts on turkey sales (Tr. 137) · 
As a result of his investigations, Mr. Squires determinec 
that for the years 1973 and 1974 the defendant-respondent had 
overadvanced approximately $750,000.00! (Exhibit P-16). Of thi: 
nearly three-quarters of a million dollars, Mr. Squires conclude: 
that about $456,000 had been overadvanced to Carlson !Jro'hers 
(Exhibits P-15, P-16 Tr. 127-128). Based upon these computiltio•:: 
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the defendant-respondent setoff the full amount of what would have 
been the 1975 settlement sum due Carlson Brothers, namely about 
$343,000 (Tr. 204). Although the defendant felt Carlson Brothers 
still had been overadvanced a net sum of $113,000 after the setoff 
from what would have been the 1975 final settlement (Tr. 204), it 
made no attempt to exercise any further setoff until after Carlson 
Brothers 1976 growing year was completed (Tr. 205, 209-210). 
The audit by Squires disclosed two major sources of the 
claimed overadvancements in favor of Carlson Brothers. First, Mr. 
Squires believed that when the defendant-respondent computed the 
1974 final settlement it overlooked a $262,000 check payable to 
Carlson Brothers as an advance (Tr. 142). Although UTG's own 
records clearly reflected the existence of this payment 
(Tr. 144-145, 210-212, 288), the payment was simply overlooked by 
both Gaylord Harward (Tr. 210-211) and the bookkeeper, Della 
Mickelsen (Tr. 288). The following colloquy occurred at trial: 
Question: Do you have any idea at all as to 
why this particular check didn't show up on 
the 1974 final settlement? 
Answer [Mr. Harward): It was just an over-
sight (Tr. 211). 
The net effect of all of this was that the defendant-
respondent made a duplicate credit to Carlson Brothers in 1974-1975 
in the sum of $262,000. First, a normal advance was made to 
Carlson Brothers, and then, at the time of settlement, that payment 
\vas overlooked (Tr. 142). The Bank, however, was not aware of the 
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overpayment (nor was Carlson Brothers). The information which 
disclosed the claimed overpayment was within, and apparently o~y 
within, the custody and control of the defendant-respondent. 
Another main source of overadvancements was caused by 
UTG's reliance on a single kind of document supplied it by 
Norbest. In making its advancements to its growers, UTG relied on 
the Nor best Settlement Summary (Tr. 355-356, 358). This document 
was a computer printout sheet which the defendant received weekly 
from Norbest. It purported to summarize sales, poundage and prices 
on a year to date basis (Tr. 354, 357). However, the defendan~ 
respondent also received weekly a product settlement summary and a 
sales remittance report ('Cr. 354). The sales remittance report 
reflected charges for the week -- the product settlement summary 
reflected weekly sales. (Id.) The major difference between the 
product settlement summary and the Norbest settlement summary was 
that the product settlement summary only purported to reflect 
actions taken weekly whereas the Norbest settlement summary, on its: 
face, purported to reflect transactions on a year to date basis 
(Tr. 357). 
UTG relied on the Norbest summary in making advancements 
to its growers (Tr. 358). It diO not use the sales remittance 
report or the product sales surrw.ary. The defel"·.~ .1 1t believed that 
all charges reflected in the sales remittance report had been 
included in the year to date figures (Tr. 358). In point of face, 
the Norbest settlement summary did not reflect all the reversP 
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settlements and chargebacks that had been assessed against the 1973 
and 1974 turkeys (Tr. 390). As a result the auditor concluded 
substantial overadvancements had thus been made. 
Although its management was concerned in 1974 and 1975 
that overadvancements had been made, UTG never totaled the product 
settlement summaries and the sales remittance reports for any given 
period and compared that total with the total figures reflected on 
the Norbest settlement summaries for the same period (Tr. 359). It 
waited until 1976 to have its accountant review the grower settle-
ment accounts (Tr. 137). A comparison of the weekly totaled 
reports and the year to date reports would have reflected the 
discrepancy between them (Tr. 360). 
Although it setoff nearly $345,000 from Carlson Brothers 
sometime during the summer of 1976, prior to late November of that 
year UTG never put plaintiff on notice that it intended to exercise 
any setoff against Carlson's 1976 crop which was covered by the new 
live flock arrangement (Tr. 76, 202-203). From July until November 
1976 the defendant paid the Bank directly for Carlson Brothers' 
turkeys it sold Norbest (Exhibit P-11, Tr. 68). In advancing 
nearly $600,000 to Carlson Brothers for its 1976 birds, the Bank 
had no knowledge that the defendant intended to exercise the setoff 
against 1976 year birds (Tr. 75). It was only in late November, 
after the Bank had advanced more than a half million dollars during 
1976, after Carlson's 1976 season was over, and only on the last 
two checks the defendant received from Norbest for Carlson Brothers 
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1976 turkeys, that defendant setoff not only the $113,000 it 
claimed was due for overadvancements to Carlsons, but also, an 
additional $28,000 for accounts receivable (insurance policy 
premiums paid) of long standing which it claimed Carlson Brothers 
owed it (Tr 207). This was admittedly not a sum which had been 
overadvanced; neither was it any obligation plaintiff owed 
defendant (Id.). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BANK DID NOT WAIVE ITS SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE 
19 7 3 THROUGH 19 7 6 CARLSON BROTHERS' TURKEYS AND/OR IN THE 
PROCEEDS THEREOF. THE LOWER COURT INCORRECTLY HELD THAT 
THERE HAD BEEN A WAIVER. 
Sectio:-J. 70A-9-306 (2) of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, 
as it was in effect prior to 1977, provided: 
Except where this chapter otherwise 
provides, a security interest continues in 
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or 
other disposition thereof by the debtor 
unless his action was authorized by the 
secured party in the security agreement or 
otherwise, and also continues in any identi-
fiable proceeds including collection received 
by the debtor. (emphasis added) 
Section 71A-9-307(l) states: 
A buyer in the ordinary course of 
business • . . other than a person buving 
farm products fro~ a person engaged in 
~rming operatiO.!:J_§_ takes free of a security 
interest created by his seller even though 
the security interest is perfected and even 
though the buyer knows of its existence. 
(emphasis added) 
Section 70A-9-l09(3) reads: 
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(3) Goods are "farm products" if they are 
crops or livestock or supplies used or 
produced in farming operations or if they are 
products of crops or livestock in their 
unmanufactured states . . . and if they are 
in the possession of a debtor engaged in 
raising, fattening, grazing or other farming 
operations. If goods are farm products thev 
are neither equipment nor inventory. ~ 
(emphasis added)l 
Based upon the foregoing provisions of the Utah Code, and 
based upon the uncontroverted evidence at trial, the Bank believes 
it had an attached and perfected security interest in the 1973 
through 1976 Carlson Brothers' turkeys and their proceeds. In 
paragraph 2 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law the 
trial court found that the Bank did properly obtain and perfect 
security interests in Carlson Brothers' turkeys and their 
proceeds. (R 261-262). Since the turkeys were "farm products" as 
defined by 70A-9-109(3) of the Code, UTG did not receive those 
turkeys free of the Bank's security interests. And unless the 
Bank authorized the disposition of the turkeys by UTG and the 
exercise of its claimed right of setoff against Carlson Brothers, 
the Bank retained its security interest in those birds and in the 
proceeds from their sale. The Bank disagrees with the court's 
1 In 1977 the statute was amended to provide: 
Except where this statute otherwise provides, a security 
interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, 
exchange or other disposition thereof unless the disposi-
tion was authorized by the secured party in the security 
agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identi-
fiable proceeds including collections received by the 
debtor. 
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finding that it waived its security interest in the proceeds as 
against UTG, and suggests to this court that the lower court 
ruling on the waiver issue was contrary to law and to the clear 
weight of the evidence at trial. 
Although the case did not deal with a continuing securi~ 
interest in farm products, in a case involving other secured 
collateral, this Court has held that a secured party's security 
interest was not extinguished when the collateral was transfer-
red. In First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Zions First National 
Bank, N.A., 537 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1975), an action to determine the 
priority of security interests in various types of non-farm 
collateral, the court held in part: 
. The security interest of plaintiff in 
the transferred assets was not extinguished 
by the plaintiff taking a new promissory note 
procured by the security agreements entered 
on February 12, 1974. The transferred assets 
not being subject to the defendant's security 
interest, the new security agreement entered 
into on February 12, 1974, does not have the 
effect of subordinating the plaintiff's 
interest in the transferred assets. Id. at 
1026-1027. 
An Oregon case involved fact situations in many ways 
analagous to those involved in this case. And in the decision 
Baker Production CreLt Association v. Long Creek Meat Co., Inc., 
513 P.2d 1129 (Ore. JJ73), the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a 
secured party's claim for proceeds · Jainst a contention that the 
Ir secured party had acquiesced in the sale of the collatera1. 
that case, the plaintiff lender financed the operation of a cilt' 
grower. The grower signed security agreements in favor of the 
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lender, which agreements provided that the collateral would not be 
sold without the secured party's consent. The grower sold the 
secured cattle to a processor. The processor was financed by a 
Bank which would pay the grower for cattle sold by the processor. 
The draft in favor of the grower was issued to the grower's 
lender, the secured party. 
In Baker the Bank for the processor and the eventual 
purchaser felt that the processor's line of credit had been used 
up. It then dishonored drafts in the sum of $88,000 payable to 
the secured party for the processor's purchase of the grower's 
cattle. Thereafter, the Bank for the eventual purchaser and the 
processor received checks from the processor for the purchase of 
cattle purchased by the processor from the grower. The Bank 
applied these checks to reduce the processors' obligation to it, 
but did not honor the drafts to the secured party. The issue was 
whether the Bank for the processor and eventual seller converted 
the collateral or proceeds of the secured party. 
The trial court held that it had so converted and the 
Supreme Court of Oregon agreed. The appellate court specifically 
held that the cattle were "farm products" within the meaning of 
the Uniform Commercial Code and that the secured creditors 
security interest continued to cover the cattle carcasses even 
though they had been sold to the processor and again to the 
eventual seller. Id. at 1132. It held the secured party's secur-
ity interest also covered the "proceeds" of those carcasses. Id. 
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A major issue on appeal was 1o1hether the secured party's 
security interest was waived because it had con sen ted to the sale 
of the cattle. The agreement between the secured party and the 
grower provided the cattle would not be sold without the secur~ 
party's consent. The appellate court agreed with the lower court 
finding that the secured party had consented on condition that 
payment was received by it when the cattle were sold to the 
eventual purchaser. Until the Bank for the processor and eventual 
purchaser refused to honor its drafts, the drafts had always bee~ 
honored and there was no reason for the secured party to object. 
Id. at 1133. When the Bank failed to pay the drafts the condi-
tions of the secured party's consent were not met. Therefore its 
security interest was not lost. Id. at 1134. 
In the course of the opinion the court wrote: 
The Code's provisions on Security interests 
in farm products prefer the secured party 
over the buyer in the ordinary course of 
business except where the secured party 
waives his interest by authorizing actions 
by the debtor which are inconsistent with 
the existence of that interest. Where, as 
here, the secured party has every reason to 
believe that its security interest will be 
recognized and protected by both its debtor 
and the purchaser from the debtor, there is 
no reason to hold that the security interest 
has been extinguish _·n. I<'l. at 1135. See 
also \'iabasso State h,mk -;:;-: Calcl·,;ell Packing 
Co., 251 N.W.2d 321 --(Minn. 321); and see 
COlorado Bank and Trust Co. v. \•)estern Slope 
Investments, Inc., 539 P.2d 501 (Colo. App. 
1975). 
First Security Bank urges that the reasoning in the 
Oregon case should apply to the case now before this Court. 
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consent given by First Security to UTG's sale of Carlson Brothers' 
turkeys (in which the Bank had a security interest) was subject to 
the condition that the Bank be paid the proceeds of any such sale 
(Tr. 77-78). The prior course of dealings between the parties had 
generally been that the Bank was so paid. Prior to mid-1976 UTG 
had never tried to setoff from the Bank sum representing alleged 
overadvancements to its growers (Tr. 78). The Bank had no prior 
knowledge that the setoffs would be made (Tr. 66, 75). It did not 
consent to such setoffs. UTG took the turkeys and proceeds 
subject to the Banks's prior perfected security interest and could 
not legitimately dispose of the birds or proceeds to the detriment 
of the Bank. The Bank did not waive its security interest in 
favor of UTG (Tr. 77). 
Plaintiff recognizes decisions in some other jurisdic-
tions have not followed the Baker P.C.A. case, supra (i.e. Clovis 
National Bank v. Thomas, 425 P.2d 726 (N.M. 1967). But it urges 
that because of the factual similarity between the facts in Baker 
and the facts in this case, and because of the clarity of its 
Baker decision in announcing a policy favoring a continuity of 
security interests which appears to follow this Court's decision 
in the Zions Bank case, supra, earlier cited, this Court should 
follow the Baker decision here. The trial court decision should 
be reversed. There simply was no waiver of its security interest 
by the Bank. 
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II. UNDER PRINCIPLES OF RESTITUTION THE DEFENDANT 
SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO RETURN THE PROCEEDS IT WITHHELD 
FROM PLAINTIFF BY REASON OF ITS SETOFFS. 
A. HAVING NEGLIGENTLY GIVEN PLAINTIFF INFOru1ATION 
WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO CHANGE ITS POSITION, 
DEFENDANT SHOULD RESTORE TO PLAINTIFF THE ~lONIES IT 
WITHHELD FRDr-1 PLAINTIFF. 
The case now before this court is not without its com-
plexity. Essentially however, the Bank believes the matter can~ 
reduced to two fairly simple propositions. The bank has (or had) 
perfected scecurity interests in the Carlson Brothers' turkeys a~ 
their proceeds. If it did not waive those security interests, it 
had a superior interest to any claimed by UTG. But if, arguendo, 
there were a waiver of the Bank's security interest in favor of 
UTG, then that waiver (if it existed) would have occurred beca~e 
the Bank changed its position in reliance: l) on the January 7, I 
1976 letter; and 2) on a course of business dealings involving the~ 
Bank and UTG which involved payments made to the Bank by UTG on 
behalf of Carlson Brothers (Exhibit P-11, Tr. 152) which payments 
were made over the years without any purported retroactive setoff~ 
having been claimed. 
As has been stated earlier, the Bank received indicatioo• 
from UTG personnel that the Bank would have as security for its 
loans to Carlson Brothers an appro~imate $400,000 sum from the 
final settlement of the 1964 year crop (Exhibit P-5, Tr. 55-551 · 
The Bank would have attempted to have diverted the 1976 turkeysc 
Carlson Brothers to another source it had been aware that UTG 
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intended to claim the offsets against Carlson Brothers (Tr. 25). 
Even if the Bank did benefit from overpayments UTG made to Carlson 
Brothers it changed its position in reliance on the accuracy of 
statements or failures to disclose by UTG. 
A leading writer in the field of restitution writes: 
A good faith recipient of a benefit can 
be excused from restitution if he has, albeit 
only partially, changed his position in such 
a way as to make it inequitable that he 
should restore it. Though most frequently 
arising where restitution is sought of 
benefits conferred by mistake, this defense 
pervades the entire field. It often overlaps 
with the defense of laches, and is analogous 
to estoppel, but a change of position is not 
ncessarily bound up with any unreasonable 
delay on the part of the claimant nor with 
any detrimental reliance on another's repre-
sentations. 
Of basic importance is that the 
recipient must not have been tortious in his 
orignial acquisition of the benefit, and that 
the change of circumstances must have taken 
place before he became aware of any duty to 
make restitution " Douthwaite, 
Attorneys Guide to Restitution § 9.2 
pp. 369-370. 
The same author continues: 
Frequent examples of the defense of 
change of position are presented where the 
mistake has resulted in the recipient's loss 
of some security right he would otherwise 
have had against a debtor, or in his having 
allowed his claim to become unenforceable by 
lapse of time. If the change of position 
consists of the fact the benefit has been 
lost, stolen, or even given away, assuming 
his complete ignorance of any possibility of 
a liability to make restitution, it would 
seem sound to let the loss be where it fell; 
by hypothesis, the recipient had no duty to 
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conserve it for the claimant. Id. at 371-372 
(emphasis added) . See also Restatement of 
Restitution § 69 (1) pp. 284 285 (1937): 
(1) The right of a person to restitu-
tion from another because of a benefit 
received because of mistake is terminated or 
diminished if, after the receipt of the 
benefit, circumstances have so changed that 
it would be unequitable to require the other 
to make full restitution. 
In Allcity Insurance Co. v. Bankers Trust Co. of Albany, 
80 Misc. 2d 899, 364 NYS./2d 791 (1975), an insurer mistakenly 
paid a bank certain monies. As a result, the bank released its 
security interest in an allegedly insured car. The insurer 
recovered from the insured but was barred from recovery against 
the bank because the bank had changed its position. The bank h~ 
lost a security interest it otherwise would have had against the 
insured, and had changed its position. 
In the case before this court the Bank changed its 
position by deciding to continue to finance the 1976 operationsclr 
Carlson Brothers because it assumed it was adequately secured. Iii 
forebore on the right it had to preclude Carlson Brothers from I 
selling its 1976 turkeys to U'l'G. It refrained from conducting it'! 
own sale, under the terms of which UTG would have been precluded I 
from diminishing the proceeds by setoff. If the Court believes i 
that the Bank did ac,uiesce in the sales by UTG to Norbest in su: 
a manner as to deprive the Bank of its security interest, th2n, 
such event, the Bank would have lost a security interest in 
reliance on a course of dealings which gave no suggest ion as tc 
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the offset against the Carlson Brothers 1975 and 1976 turkey 
crop. Any one of these would have constituted a change of posi-
tion by the Bank which precluded any offset by the defendant UTG. 
B. HAVING MADE A WHOLE SERIES OF PAYNENTS DIRECTLY TO THE 
BANK UNDER THE 1976 LIVE FLOCK MARKETING ARRANGEMENT, AND 
HAVING GIVEN THE BANK NO INDICATION OF ITS INTENT TO SETOFF 
AGAINST 1976 TURKEYS UNTIL AFTER CARLSON BROTHERS' 1976 
GROWING YEAR AND THE BANK'S FINANCING OF CARLSON FOR THAT 
YEAR HAS ALMOST COMPLETED, UTG SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO 
RETAIN THE SUMS IT RECEIVED FOR CARLSON BROTHERS' 1976 
BIRDS, AND WHICH IT SETOFF AGAINST THE BANK. 
As mentioned earlier, in June, 1976, Carlson Brothers 
materially altered its contractual arrangement with UTG by enter-
ing into a live flock marketing agreement (Exhibits P-12, P-13, 
Tr. 180-190). Earlier in this memorandum mention has been made as 
to how this arrangement revised both the marketing relationship 
and contractual posture of Carlson Brothers' role in UTG (see 
pages 5-6 hereof). When UTG was organized it was anticipated that 
it would function solely on a common pool basis. No thought was 
given to the possibility that in the future a grower might choose 
to participate on a live flock basis (Tr. 321-322). In 
conjunction with Carlson Brothers' change to the live flock 
marketing arrangement, all checks or advancements UTG was to pay 
to Carlson Brothers were to go directly to the Bank with plaintiff 
listed as sole payee (Exhibit P-ll), Tr. 60-61). 
Until late November 1976, all UTG advances to Carlson 
Brothers on the 1976 birds were sent directly to the Bank or 
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credited to the Bank (Exhibit P-22, Tr. 201-202). From August 
through October, 1976, this course of dealings continued without 
any attempt by UTC to setoff or recoup from the 1976 direct line 
birds, proceeds claimed to have been overadvanced to Carlson 
Brothers in prior years (Tr. 203). Significantly, although UTG 
had decided by August, 1976, to offset the claimed 1973 and 1974 
overadvances against its growers, it never informed the Bank of 
this intention until it setoff against the last two payments due 
the Bank in late November, 1976 (Tr. 202-203). 
Only after Carlson Brothers had completed its 1976 
growing season and after the Bank, in reliance on UTG's repre-
sentations, had financed Carlson's operations for that year, did 
UTG attempt the setoff againnst the 1976 birds (Tr. 205, 210). h:: 
no time prior to November 15, 1976 did UTG ever attempt to setoff 
on checks payable to the Bank any claimed sum owed it by Carlson 
Brothers (Tr. 204-205). The only time an offset was made against 
1 
1976 Carlson Brothers' birds was on the final two payments of thE 1 
year (Tr. 205). Even though the 1976 birds were governed by a 
completely different contractual arrangement, between UTG and 
Carlson Brothers, UTG still setoff proceeds received for 1976 
birds against the alleged overadvances made during the old 
arrangement (Tr. 209). 
And UTG not only setoff some $113,000 for the balance 
the purported earlier 1973 and 1974 overadvancements, but also 1 
additional sum of $28,427.65 (Exhibit P-21) which was for an 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-25-
alleged account receivable Carlson Brothers - not the Bank - owed 
uTG (Tr. 207). This sum had nothing to do 1vith processing fees 
incurred by UTG, but was nonetheless setoff from a check made 
payable to the Bank, a sum which UTG claimed Carlson Brothers owed 
it (Tr. 107). 
The plaintiff Bank urges that having established a course 
of dealings by which 1976 bird payments were made without setoff 
until the very end of the payment year, that by recognizing the 
1976 live flock marketing agreement created a different contrac-
tual arrangement than the old one, and by failing to timely inform 
the Bank of any claimed offset on the 1976 birds until it was too 
late for the Bank to protect itself, UTG should be estopped fr.om 
claiming both the $113,000 sum setoff for the alleged earlier 
overadvances and the $28,427.65 sum for the old account receiv-
able. Particularly with respect to the latter setoff the Bank 
never received any value for that receivable. 
The earlier mentioned Professor Douthwaite writes the 
following: 
Where a recipient's change of position 
results from his reliance on an express 
representation, or one implicit from the fact 
situation, a claimant can be estopped from 
asserting his claim to restitution. Closely 
parallel is the doctrine that a known right 
can be lost by its waiver, or intentional 
relinquishment. The conceptual difference 
between estoppel and waiver in so far as they 
relate to defenses to restitution, may thus 
be explained: When a claimant is defeated by 
reason of estoppel it is because he has been 
"stopped" from claiming another's enrichment 
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as unjust because it is he, himself, who by 
words or conduct has caused the other to act 
to his detriment; when, on the other hand, 
the defense is based on waiver, the thinking 
is more that it is the policy favoring the 
stability of transactions, of requiring that 
"commitments seriously assumed are to be 
honored," that stands in the way of his claim. 
Mere negligence on the part of a 
mistaken payor of money is not of itself a 
bar to restitution if the recipient has not 
changed his position; however, a willful 
neglect to investiage the facts before making 
payment can, in a strong enough case, be so 
blatant as to estop the payor from asserting 
his mistake. After discovery of the mistake, 
if the payor fails promptly to notify the 
recipient of the mistake, and this results in 
prejudice to the latter, there is an overlap 
between change of position and estoppel as a 
defense. Douthwaite, supra at 9.3, pp. 
374-375. --
Plaintiff does not contend the defendant wilfully or 
fraudulently misled plaintiff. Plaintiff respects and admires 
officers and management of UTG. It does contend that defendant 
was negligent, that plaintiff changed its position based on 
negligent statements of UTG on which plaintiff was entitled ~ 
rely. It believes UTG negligently failed to timely inform the 
Bank of UTG' s intended setoff against the 1976 birds which were 
governed by the new arrangement. As a result, when the setoffs 
finally were claimed, the Bank was left without protection, 
! 
without adequate security, and without means to cover its losses,: 
And those losses either would not have occurred or could have b'i 
mitigated but for the negligence of UTG. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT UTG WAS NOT 
NEGLIGENT, THAT IT HAD NO PECUNIARY INTEREST IN THE 
TRANSACTION OF BUSINESS BETWEEN CARLSON BROTHERS AND 
THE BANK, AND THAT THE BANK DID NOT RELY ON THE 
JANUARY 7, 1976, LETTER ARE ALL CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE 
AND CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. AS A RESULT, THE TRIAL COURT 
JUDGMENT ON THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
A. THE IMPACT OF UTG'S NEGLIGENCE. 
In a rather recent decision this Court has held that 
where a party negligently supplies information to one whom it 
knows or should know will rely on the accuracy of that informa-
tion, such negligence renders it liable to one who does in fact 
rely on that information. In Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 
P.2d 806 (Utah 1974) an action by a stock purchaser against, among 
others, an accounting firm, this Court held that lack of privity 
between a third party and an accountant is not a defense in tort 
~~ where the accountant is aware that its work will be relied on by 
the third person. 
In the course of its opinion this Court wrote: 
. . • Other courts have taken the view that 
an accountant is liable for his negligence to 
a relying party, despite the absence of 
privity, when in preparing his report the 
accountant knew that a particular party or 
parties would rely on the report for a par-
ticular purpose. We are of the opinion that 
the lack of privity is not a defense where an 
accountant who is aware of the fact that his 
work will be relied on by a party or parties 
who may extend credit to his client or assume 
his client's obligations ... Id. at 808. 
An analagous provision in the Restatement of Torts 2d 
reflects the same policy underlying this Court's decision in 
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Milliner, supra. Restatemen:.: of Torts 2d, Section 552 deals wit:, 
liability of one who negligently supplies information for the 
guidance of others. That Section states: 
(1) One who, in the course of his business, 
employment or in any other tian5aetion in 
which he has ~pecuniary interest, supplies 
false information for the guidance of others 
in their business transactions, is subject to 
pecuniary loss caused to them by their 
justifiable reliance upon the information, if 
he fails to exercise reasonable care or 
competence in obtaining or communicating the 
information. Restatement of Torts 2d, supra 
§ 552 pp. 126-127 (1977) (emphasis supplied). 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the actor's 
conduct need only be negligent - not fraudulent. See Comment(<),: 
Restatement of Torts 2d, supra at pp. 127-128. In addition, the ' 
I 
negligent representor is liable if he either makes the represent?- I 
I 
tion within the scope of his business or employment or if he has 
pecuniary interest. While recognizing that although not 
conclusive: 
• . that the information is given in the 
course of the defendant's business, profes-
sion or employment is a sufficient indication 
that he has a pecuniary interest in it, even 
though he receives no consideration for it at 
the time. Comment lQl, supra at pp. 129-130. 
The same Comment indicates that: 
... officers of a corporation, '-'-though 
they receive no personal considecation for 
giving information concerning itc affairs, 
may have a pecuniary interest in ~ts trans-
actions, since they stand to prof-
indirectly from them . Id. at ~'· 129. 
See also Comments (b) and (c), supr~. 
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And in its decision in Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 
549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1976), this Court IHote: 
Estoppel is a doctrine of equity proposed to 
rescue from loss a party who has, without 
fault, been deluded into a course of action 
by the wrong or neglect of another. The 
measure we apply to plaintiffs' claim of 
estoppel is an adaptation to this case of the 
standard heretofore approved by this court: 
Estoppel arises when a party (defendant 
Board) by his acts, representations, or 
admissions, or by his silence when he ought 
to speak, intentionally or through culpable 
negligence, induces another (plaintiffs) to 
believe certain facts to exist and that such 
other (plaintiffs) acting with reasonable 
prudence and diligence, relies and acts 
thereon so that he will suffer an injustice 
if the former (Land Board) is permitted to 
deny the existence of such facts. Id. at 697 
(emphasis added). See also Baggs v~ 
Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974) but see 
Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953); 
Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 
P.2d 30 (1965); Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat 
Bros., 15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000 (1964); 
EaStOn V. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332 
(1965). 
In its findings of facts and conclusion of law, the trial 
court held the following: (1) that defendant's failure to detect 
the issuance of the $262,000 check (Exhibit P-18) when it computed 
the 1974 final settlement was not negligence (R 265 par. 10); (2) 
that neither Gaylord Harward nor UTG had any pecuniary interest in 
business transactions between the Bank and Carlson Brothers, and 
that there was no pecuniary advantage to UTG that the Bank 
furnished financing to Carlson Brothers (R 267-268, pars. 13, 14); 
and (3) that there was no evidence that had the Bank known of the 
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offsets to be assessed against Carlson brothers it would have 
declined future advances in 1976 and that no evidence supported 
plaintiff's claim that credit was extended to Carlson Brothers 
based on the January 7, 1976 letter (R 267, 270 pars. 13, 20). 
I 
As to the finding that the defendant was not negligent i:: 
creating and discovering the nearly three-quarters of a million 
dollars in overadvances to its growers, plaintiff respectfully 
suggests the uncontroverted facts compel a contrary conclusion. I 
I 
The sheer magnitude of the sums involved and the time length over 
1 
which they occurred are remarkable. Few businesses can afford to I 
I 
misaccount for $750,000. UTG's then manager was aware of shor~ I 
ages in both 1974 and 1975, but no attempt was apparently made~ 
have an accountant review the grower settlement accounts until 
mid-1976 (Tr. 137). With respect to the $262,000 check advance 
which the manager and the bookkeeper failed to include in Carlson 
Brothers' final settlement for the 1974 growing year, both 
admitted they simply overlooked this check (Tr. 210-211, 288). 
Significantly, that check was not missing from UTG's check ledger 
when the mistake was made (TR. 28 8) • When Mr. Squires revei~1ed 
the settlements, he located the error (Tr. 142). And it was not 
necessary for him to look beyonct UTG's own books to discover that 
the oversight had occurred {Tr. 142-14~). 
With respect to the over advances c<- used by UTG' s relia"" 
on the Norbest settlement summaries, a comp~rison and totaling' 
the product settlement summaries and of the sales remittance 
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reports with the totals sh01m on the Norbest settlement summaries 
would have revealed the discrepancies between the two figures 
(Tr. 360). When the accountant did so, the error was spotted. 
In summary, the evidence concerning the overadvancements 
i·l to its growers seems to have been within the sole custody of UTG. 
Massive miscalculations of amounts were made and, as a result, the 
Bank suffered substantial losses. The mistakes, however well-
intentioned, were material. UTG knew the Bank looked to it to 
~r I provide accurate information as to the status on Carlson Brothers' 
tc !, 197 5 turkeys (Tr. 15 4) . It assumed the Bank would use the 
I 
:- I information contained in the January 7, 1976, letter (Tr. 158). 
~ Defendant's own expert witness testified that in his experience 
few accounting errors are made that come before final settlement 
(Tr. 255). The finding of the trial court that actions of the 
~ defendant did not constitute negligence is against the clear 
weight of all the evidence. It is respectfully contended that 
this Court should reverse the findings of the trial judge. 
Q'' B. THE H-IP ACT OF UTG' S PECUNIARY INTEREST. 
Plaintiff also avers that the trial court finding that no 
ot pecuniary interest furnished a motivation for the January 7, 1976, 
h~ letter is similarly against the weight of all the evidence. At 
the outset, attention is called again to the language in Restate-
a,· ~ of Torts 2nd, Section 552 (l), supra. As plaintiff reads that 
1 r S~ction, it imposes liability for the negligent supplying of 
information to others if only one of two possible conditions 
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exist: (1) if the statement is made in the course of business o: 
employment, or (2) if the speaker as a business representative or 
the business has any pecuniary interest in the business. Id. 
supra. See also Comments (a), (b), (c) and (d). Since UTG's mrt 
Manager wrote the January 7, 1976, letter under UTG's own letter-
head (Exhibit P-9), and since he admittedly wrote that letter ~ 
behalf of UTG (Tr. 150), the requisite bases for liability seem t' 
exist regardless of the pecuniary interest. 
However, the undisputed evidence introduced at trial Ha: 
that UTG did have a pecuniary interest in whether Carlson Brother· 
participated as its member grower. As a general rule a grower's, 
turkey raising operations are financed by a lender (Tr. 171-172). 
UTG knew that the Bank financed Carlson Brothers (Tr. 172, 333). 
Since the Bank did not finance UTG in 1977 and Carlson Brothers 
did not grow turkeys in 1977, it is apparent that Carlson Brothe: 
needed financing to stay in business. The whole purpose for an 
agricultural cooperative is to have a group of growers so that 
unit costs for each member will be minimized (Tr. 170). The 
of any grower hurts a coop. And the larger the grower, the 1arc 
the loss (Tr. 170-171). UTG' s manager test if ieo that if in 197'1 
UTG had lost Carlson Brothers' 1siness, that loss would ha~' 
an adverse economic effect upon t'G for that year (Tr. 171). 
In addition, in its business operations, UTG assesses 
proces::;ing charge per pound on all grower t11rkeys it picks ur 
(Tr. 174). These charges are assesseC! on a p0r pounC! basis s' 
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that the greater the grower poundage, the greater the processing 
charge (Tr. 175). The processing charges are used to pay UTG's 
overhead, its utility and other day-to-day operation costs, and 
employee salaries (TR.l75). The more poundage Carlson Brothers 
produced, the more processing fees UTG would obtain for payment of 
salaries, overhead and operating expenses (Tr. 176). And at 
trial, Manager conceded that it was very much in UTG's interest to 
have Carlson Brothers producing, and producing a substantial 
volume of turkeys (Id.). 
The finding that UTG had no pecuniary interest in the 
continuance of the banking relationship between plaintiff and 
Carlson Brothers is simply contrary to the evidence. There was 
such a pecuniary interest and UTG should be liable to plaintiff 
for damages caused by the negligence, however well-meaning, of UTG. 
C. THE HlP ACT OF THE BANK'S RELIANCE. 
Finally, plaintiff urges the uncontroverted evidence also 
establishes that the Bank did rely on the January 7, 1979, letter 
in advancing 1976 sums to Carlson Brothers. Mr. Cheever testified 
the letter was a part of the information relied on by the Bank to 
extend 1976 financing (Tr. 52). Roy Hanson also stated that the 
January 7 letter was "a very basic factor in our decision as to 
lvhether we v1ould finance them" [Carlson Brothers] (Tr. 101). The 
Bank's approval of its 1976 decision to finance Carlson Brothers 
was based, at least in part, on the expectation that some 
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$400,000.00 would be forthcoming to the Bank from the 1976 year 
Carlson Brothers' birds (Tr. 104). The Bank also relied on 
receiving the proceeds of the 1976 birds under the live marketinc 
contract (Tr. 65). 
UTG assumed the Bank would rely on the accuracy of the 
figures contained in the January 7 letter (Tr. 154). It assumed 
the Bank requested the information concerning the 1975 Carlson 
Brother's turkeys because Carlson still owed the Bank money 
(Tr. 155). By giving the Bank information as to tonnage price, 
assuming 1975-1976 market conditions held (ana little if any 
evidence shows they did not so hold for that year) UTG gave the ' 
Bank a basis by which it could multiply tonnage by anticipated 
price so that a possible final settlement figure could be 
estimated (Tr. 151). Importantly, UTG assumed the Bank would mo<• 
such multiplications so that it could anticipate the possible lri 
settlement sum for Carlson Brothers (Tr. 158). 
Plaintiff urges that here again the trial court findi~c 
I 
was against the uncontroverted evidence at trial and should be I 
reversed. In addition, the Bank strongly asserts that the tria:, 
i 
court's finding concerning the Department of Agriculture's I 
requirements (R-263 par. 7) is not only irrelevant but unsuppor:.l 
by evidence introduced at trial. 
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IV. THERE WAS A LACK OF MUTUALITY BETWEEN UTG AND THE 
BANK, AND THUS UTG WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DEPRIVE THE BANK 
OF PROCEEDS OF THE SALES OF CARLSON BROTHERS' TURKEYS. 
THIS WAS BECAUSE UTG COULD NOT EXERCISE A SETOFF AGAINST 
THE BANK FOR AN OBLIGATION CARLSON BROTHERS, AND NOT THE 
BANK, ALLEGEDLY OWED UTG. 
When UTG deprived the Bank of proceeds UTG had received 
from the sale of 1975 and 1976 Carlson Brothers' turkeys in which 
the Bank had a security interest, UTG seems to have assumed that 
if it had the right of setoff against Carlson Brothers it also had 
the same right of setoff against the Bank. The plaintiff Bank 
believes this reasoning was erroneous because UTG failed to take 
into account the lack of mutuality of obligation between it and 
the Bank. 
The Bank and Carlson Brothers stood in different 
positions vis-a-vis UTG. Carlson Brothers was contractually 
olbligated to both UTG and the Bank. The Bank had no written 
contract with UTG (TR. 88). The Bank did not agree to be bound by 
UTG's bylaws. Plaintiff did not sign any grower contract with 
UTG. It merely financed the operations of Carlson Brothers. The 
Bank had a security interest in the Carlson Brothers' turkeys. 
UTG did not (Exhibit P-7). Until Carlson Brothers' obligations to 
the Bank were fully paid the Bank had the right to the proceeds of 
all sales of the turkeys and it had a security interest in those 
birds. UTG was aware of those security interests and generally 
recognized them prior to 1976. 
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If UTG, as a result of its own erroneous computations, 
overadvanced monies to Carlson Brothers, its remedy was against 
Carlson Brothers. But it did not have the right to refuse to 
deliver to the Bank proceeds from the sale of collateral in whic' 
the Bank had a security interest. 
It is basic general law that before one party can exe~ 
cise a right of setoff against another, there must be a mutualit" 
of obligation. There may have been mutuality of obligation 
between the Carlson Brothers and UTG and there was a mutuali~~~ 
obligation between the Bank and Carlson Brothers. But there was 
lack of mutuality between the Bank and UTG which should have 
precluded any right of UTG to setoff against the Bank. The simpi 
fact is that UTG had no legal right to refuse to deliver to the 
Bank those proceeds for the sale of Carlson Brothers' collater~ 
in which the Bank had a perfected security interest. See geM~ 
ally 80 C.J. S. Set-Off ~ Counterclaim, § 48 (c), p. 79 states: 
As a general rule a debt against a third 
party to the record or a demand against the 
plaintiff in favor of a third person not a 
party to the action cannot be pleaded in 
recoupment, compensation or reconvention, or 
as a counterclaim, cross action, or set-off. 
I 
In the Oklahoma decisi.on of Sarkeys v. _~larlow, 235 P.2: 1 
676 (Okla. 1951) an action to recover rents allegedly due on re'' 
property, the syllabus by the court set forth the general rules .. 
law pertaining to set-off: 
2. There must be privity of 
parties in order to enable a defendant to 
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plead and prove a set-off, and defendant 
cannot plead and Prove a set-off in favor of 
himself and against one who is not a party to 
the suit. 
3. To warrant a set-off debts must be 
mutual and the principle of mutuality 
requires that the debts should be due to and 
from the same persons and in the same 
capacity. Id. at 677. (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff is aware of the recent Utah decision, Preston 
v. Gulf Oil Company, 565 P.2d 787 (1977). In that case this Court 
held that where a lessee on an oil lease had mistakenly made some 
overpayments to the lessor, where when the error was noted the 
lessee promptly notified the lessor and withheld future payments 
until the sum had been recovered, and then began making correct 
payments, and where the lessor had not been prejudiced by the 
overpayment, that the lessee could recoup. 
The Bank believes Preston is distinguishable from the 
case before this court in the following material particulars: 
(1) There was a mutuality of obligation in Preston 
between the lessor and lessee. There is not in this case. 
(2) Preston did not involve a situation where 
collateral or proceeds of a protected secured creditor were 
withheld from the secured creditor, whereas this case does involve 
rights and interests of a secured party. 
(3) The lessor in Preston has been made whole, 
whereas here the Bank has suffered major damage as a result of the 
withholding of the proceeds; 
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(4) In Preston the lessee promptly notified the 
lessor of its mistaken overpayment, whereas UTG officials were 
aware of a potential problem years before the setoff was claim~ 
and months before they notified the Bank of the decision to seto: 
while the Bank was lending money to Carl sons with the expectatio~ 
that its loans were secured by the final settlement on the 1975 
birds and on all the 1976 birds. UTG exercised its setoff on t~l 
' 
1976 bird proceeds only at the end of the year after having never I 
asserted a setoff right to 1976 bird proceeds until the last t~ 
payments (Tr. 106-107, 204, 205). 
(5) In Preston there had been no prejudice to the 
lessor as a result of the overpayments, whereas in this case tle 
Bank was materially prejudiced, not only because it assumed no 
setoff would be claimed, but also because UTG led the Bank to 
believe it would receive proceeds from the 1975 and 1976 birds~' 
Carlson Brothers. 
(6) The lessor in Preston suffered no damages fro-
1 
the setoff whereas in this case plaintiff did suffer damages I 
because it lost a substantial security (the proceeds) it believe:! 
it had. In addition, UTG setoff from the Bank some $28,000.00 i' 1 
accounts receivable Carlson Brothers 01~ed UTG. The Bank had nel'' 
received any payment for or benefit from such accounts receiv-
able. They were de!Jts pure and simple bet1~een UTG and Carlson 
Brothers. Yet UTG withheld proceeds b~longing to the Bank to 
satisfy an obligation Carlson Brothers, and not the Bank, oweu 
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UTG. The lessor in Preston did not suffer damages because it 
advanced monies which were overpaid it. In Preston no security 
interest of the lessor was violated as a result of the over-
payments by the lessee. 
V. UTG CONVERTED THE CARLSON BROTHERS' TURKEYS OR THE 
PROCEEDS THEREOF RELEVANT TO THIS ACTION. 
The elements of the tort of conversion are: 
(1) An intentional interference by the defendant 
with a plaintiff's right to possession of personal property; 
(2) A material tortious inference by the defendant 
in such a manner as to deprive the plaintiff of his rightful use 
of the property; and 
(3) Damages which consist of the full value of the 
property at the time of the conversion. Allred v. Hinkley 8 Utah 
2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1958); see also 18 Am.Jur.2d 
Conversion§ 18, 43 and 47. 
The Baker Production Credit Association, supra, decision 
referred to at some length in Section I hereof on security 
interests specifically involved a successful claim of a secured 
creditor that its proceeds had been converted. Id. at 1130-31, 
1137. Other decisions in Western States have recognized that 
money, as well as other personal property may be converted. Wood 
Industrial Coro. v. Rose, 271 Ore. 103,530 P.2d 1245, 1248 (1975); 
Marker v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 103 Ariz. 353, 442 P.2d 97, 
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104 (1968). Similarly, the failure of a person to deliv"r to the 
owner funds held in trust has been held to constitute a conver-
sion. Inland-Ryerson Construction v. Brazier Const., 7 Wash App, 
558, 500 p.2d 1015, 1021 (1972) 0 
In the case before this court, the Bank had a security 
interest in the subject property. The sale of the collateral and 
subsequent withholding of the proceeds thereof by UTG deprived t~i 
bank of both the collateral and the proceeds. UTG converted 
assets of the Bank to satisfy alleged offsets it claimed Carlsoo 
Brothers owed it. To do so damaged the Bank to the full extent~ 
the collateral and proceeds converted. 
Plaintiff contends the elements of the tort were esta~ 
lished at trial. There was general agreement among several of 
UTG's growers who testified at trial that the price Norbest pa~ 
for turkeys during the 1973 through 1976 years was a rather 
accurate reflection of the going fair market value of the birds. 
(Tr. 305, 308-309) 
I 
VI. UNDER THEORIES OF ESTOPPEL, PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL OF I 
WAIVER UTG SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FRON CLAIMING AN OFFSET 
AGAINST THE BANK. 
Earlier in this memorandum the Bank has cited language 
from the Utah Supreme Court's decision in ~1organ v. Boar~ 
Lands, supra, which sugge:;ted that estoppel may arise 1·7hen one 
party by its actions or silence intentionally or negligently 
induces another to believe certain facts to exist and inrluces 
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reasonable reliance and consequent injustice. Id. at 695. See 
also Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974). But see 
other cases mentioned on page 29 in section III(A) hereof. 
In the instant case, with knowledge that the Bank sought 
information as to the status of Carlson Brothers UTG supplied the 
Bank with the information which influenced it to loan money to 
Carlson Brothers. Even if UTG did not know in January, 1976, that 
substantial overpayments had been made, the information was within 
their knowledge--and apparently only within their knowledge. The 
apparent erroneous overpayments, and the representations to the 
Bank concerning the financial status of Carlson Brothers, without 
taking reasonable care to ascertain the existence of the over-
payments was, in the Bank's opinion, negligence. The size of the 
overpayments involved here must certainly militate against holding 
that the overpayment was a slight error or excusable negligence. 
An analagous principle relied on by the Bank is that of 
promissory estoppel. Although this Court has used the doctrine 
somewhat sparingly (e.g. Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 286, 295 P.2d 
332 (1956); Petty v. Gincly, 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30 (1965); 
Union Tank Car Company v. 1\Theat Bros., 15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 
1000 (1965), the doctrine has been recognized. The elements of 
that doctrine are set out in the Restatement of Contracts, § 90 
and were quoted by this Court in Ravarino v. Price, P.2cl 570, 575 
(l953) : 
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A promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or fore-
bearance of a definite and substantial 
character on the part o~ the promise and 
which does induce such action or forebearance 
is binding if injustice can be avoided only 
by enforcement of the promise. 
The Bank believes those conditions are all met by the 
fact situation involved in this lawsuit and that promissory 
estoppel and/or estoppel should preclude UTG from claiming a 
setoff against the Bank. 
The Bank retained its security interest in Carlson 
Brothers 1 turkeys and their proceeds. Any disposition of either 
by UTG was subject to 
the Bank the full sum 
the Bank 1 s security interests and UTG owesJ 
of such proceeds. If, notwithstanding the"'• 
arguments, this Court finds the Bank waived or lost its securi~ 
interest in favor of UTG, then UTG is still liable to the Bank 
because the Bank would have lost its security interest • • I 1n rel1anc· 
on UTG 1 s indications that the Bank would be paid. I I 
In any event UTG may not setoff against the Bank monies I 
the Bank never received from either UTG or Carlson Brothers. 
1 
Additionally, under theories of conversion, negligence, estoppel\ 
and promissory estoppel UTG is liable to the Bank for the full 
of monies UTG withheld. The decision of the trial court which 
dismissed the complaint should be reversed. Ani~ the trial cour' 
should be directed to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff· 
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the sum of $457,608.00, or, alternately, the sum of $142,306.79 
(which includes the sum of $113,878.54 plus $28,427.65). 
DATED this .::lrday of 
_ _,tJCI/>VA(&:::J.-====-' 19 7 9 • 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed two (2) copies of Appellant's 
Brief to Tex R. Olsen, of Olsen and Chamberlain, 76 South 
Main Street, Richfield, Utah 84701, on this ~ day of 
June, 1979. 
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